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Abstract 
We study the convergence of sovereign debt accumulation in five European Monetary Union (EMU) 
countries using quarterly data from June 2009 to June 2013, with a focus on debt ratio convergence 
following the 2009 sovereign debt crisis and the adoption of fiscal consolidation programmes. We test 
the Phillips and Sul (2007) club convergence hypothesis. We find the evidence of a lack of debt 
convergence for Greece and Portugal. Our results support the view that there is not a uniform austerity 
prescription for all, especially, without emphasizing friendly growth policies, which makes these countries 
more prone to investors' sentiments. 
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Convergence in sovereign debt ratios across highly in debt EU 





We study the convergence of sovereign debt accumulation in 5 EMU countries using 
quarterly data from 2009 to 2012 with a focus on debt ratios convergence following the 2009 
sovereign debt crisis and the adoption of fiscal consolidation programs. We test the Phillips 
and Sul (2007) club convergence hypothesis. We find evidence of a lack of debt convergence 
for Greece and Portugal. Our results support the view that there is not a uniform austerity 
prescription for all, especially, without emphasizing friendly growth policies, which makes 
these countries more prone to investors’ sentiments. 
 
Keywords: debt ratios, convergence, club convergence approach, countries under fiscal 
consolidation 
















In the eye of the sovereign debt storm provoked by the 2008-10 world crisis as well as the 
failure of some European Monetary Union (EMU) member countries, specifically, Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, to comply with the requirement of a Debt/GDP 
ratio of less than 60 percent of GDP has led to the introduction of a number of austerity 
measures (i.e., fiscal consolidation), including public expenditure cuts and higher taxes. 
These economies are currently caught up in a vicious cycle of austerity measures making 
recovery more difficult. Critics argue that these measures are counter-productive, pushing the 
countries further into recession. Given that these countries faced different initial conditions 
and debt dynamic paths, implying that they should have adopted different policies (the well-
known issue of ‘one size doesn't fit all’), the fact of receiving homogeneous austerity 
measures could have jeopardized the success of such programs and the speedy exit from the 
crisis.  
At the same time, these countries’ interdependence implies that the debt motion law 
of one country depends on that of the others; thus, in the presence of spillovers across them 
policy actions should take them into account. Moreover, fiscal convergence is an important 
pre-requisite for the efficient functioning of the EMU, the goal of this paper is to explore debt 
convergence (potentially to a debt target ratio) in these countries after the recent debt 
sovereign crises in the EMU. Concerns that fiscal policy might jeopardize the stability of the 
debt target and the currency have been paramount (Galor, 1996). That rationale is well 
documented in the literature (Artis and Winkler 1997; Beetsma 2001; Fatas et al., 2003). The 
results will shed light on the long-term evolution of debt/GDP ratios, growth rates and long-
term interest rates in these countries after a period of strict fiscal consolidation programs. Our 
paper’s novelties are twofold. It analyzes debt ration convergence after the recent crisis on 
debt in a group of countries that adopted fiscal consolidation programs, while the 
implementation of the new methodology of panel convergence testing, recommended by 
Phillips and Sul (2007) based on the club convergence hypothesis, which considers that 
certain countries that belong to a club move from disequilibrium positions to their club-
specific steady-state positions. This methodology has several appealing characteristics: i) no 
specific assumptions concerning the stationarity of the variable of interest are necessary, ii) 
this convergence test is interpreted as an asymptotic cointegration test without suffering from 
the small sample problems, and iii) it is based on a quite general form of a nonlinear time 
varying factor model.   
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Although debt sustainability has been the focus of many theoretical and empirical 
papers (Escolano, 2010), few have specifically considered debt ratios convergence, while 
Gros (2011) shows that austerity policies could be self-defeating. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodological framework, 
while Section 3 analyzes convergence issues on debt dynamics through econometric 
estimations. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
In this section, we outline the methodology proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) (henceforth 
PS) to test for convergence in a panel of countries and to identify any convergence clubs. PS 
propose an econometric approach for testing the convergence hypothesis and the 
identification of convergence clubs. Their method uses a nonlinear time-varying factor model 
and provides the framework for modeling transitional dynamics as well as long run behavior. 
Furthermore, their statistical methodology can test for convergence in economic variables   
other than output. The new methodology adopts the following time-varying common-factor 
representation for ity  of country i: 
titity µδ= ,        (1) 
where tµ  is a single common component and itδ  is a time-varying idiosyncratic element that 
captures the deviation of country i from the common path defined by tµ . Within this 
framework, all N economies will converge, at some point in the future, to the steady state, if 
δδ =+∞→ kitklim  for all i = 1, 2, …, N, irrespective of whether countries are near the steady state 
or in transition. This is important given that the paths to the steady state (or states) across 
countries can differ significantly.   
The goal of PS is to test whether variables ity ,  i = 1, 2, …, N tend to converge to a 
single steady state as ∞→t .  To this direction they adopt a factor representation titity µδ=   
for  each variable in the sample.  The factor tµ  is assumed common across economies, while 
the transition dynamics are captured by the idiosyncratic components itδ which are allowed to 
vary across cross section and time.  Convergence is a dynamic process. Since  itδ trace out the 
transition paths, convergence can be tested by examining the temporal relative evolution of  
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itδ . PS do not assume any parametric form for tµ ; they just factor it out and they concentrate 
on   itδ . Since we cannot directly estimate itδ  from equation (1) due to over-
parameterization, PS assume a semiparametric form for itδ , which enables them to construct 
a formal test for convergence. In particular, they eliminate the common component tµ  

















       (2) 
The relative measure ith captures the transition path with respect to the panel average. 
Defining a formal econometric test of convergence as well as an empirical algorithm of 
defining club convergence requires the following assumption for the semi-parametric form 
for the time-varying coefficients itδ : 







= , 0>iσ , 0≥t , and itξ  is weakly dependent over t, but iid(0,1) over i. 
The function )(tL  varies slowly, increasing and diverging at infinity. Under this specific 
form for itδ , the null hypothesis of convergence for all i, takes the form: 
0,:0 ≥= αδδ iH , while the alternative hypothesis of non-convergence for some i, takes 
the form: 0: <≠ αδδ orH iA . PS show that we can test for the null of convergence in 
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2)1(1 and α̂2ˆ =b , 
where ith  is defined in equation (2) and α̂  is the least squares estimate of α . Under the null 
hypothesis of convergence, the dependent variable diverges whether 0>α , or 0=α . In this 
case, we can test the convergence hypothesis by a t-test of the inequality, 0≥α . The t-test 
                                                          
1 Following the recommendation of PS, we choose r values in the interval [0.2, 0.3]. 
5 
 
statistic follows the standard normal distribution asymptotically and is constructed using a 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard error. PS call the one-sided t -test, 
which is based on 
b
t ˆ , the tlog  test due to the presence of the log t regressor in equation (4).  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
Quarterly data on net sovereign debt to GDP ratios are obtained from the Datastream 
database for Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain spanning the period 2009-2012.  
Table 1 reports the empirical results. The results of the full sample reject the null hypothesis 
of debt convergence, since the point estimate of the log(t) statistic is -13.928 (with critical 
value equal to -1.67). The results indicate the presence of two clubs. Three countries (Cyprus, 
Ireland, and Spain) form the first club, whereas the second club includes the remaining two 
countries (Greece and Portugal). The 2 different clubs indicate that although all countries 
adopted fiscal consolidation programs, the two groups followed different routes, indicating 
that the implementation of a uniform consolidation program cannot achieve the same 
(expected) results if it ignores the idiosyncratic characteristics of each country.  
 
Table 1: Debt ratios convergence 











Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Spain -0.374 -1.092 
 
2nd club 
Greece, Portugal 1.563 3.875 
 
 
Phillips and Sul (2009) argue that the convergence club methodology overestimates the 
number of clubs than their true number. To avoid this overdetermination, they estimate 
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convergence across the sub-clubs to assess whether any evidence exists in support of merging 
clubs into larger clubs. The results are reported in Table 2. The empirical findings display 
that for the two sub-clubs there is no evidence to support mergers of the original clubs.  
Table 2: Convergence club classification  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Club  Tests of club merging  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  1  Club 1+2 = -0.116*   
          (-5.93) 
  2   _____ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
* denotes statistical significant at the 5% level and rejects the null hypothesis of convergence. The figures in 
parenthesis denote t-statistics. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper offered an empirical analysis of debt ratios convergence for a number of EMU 
countries that have been explicitly or implicitly under fiscal consolidation programs followed 
the 2009 sovereign debt crisis. It examined debt ratios convergence for Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, countries that implement austerity programs following the 
debt sovereign crisis of 2009. The results documented that although Cyprus, Ireland and 
Spain continued to be in the same convergence club, while Greece and Portugal formed their 
own club, potentially indicating that fiscal consolidation programs in these countries did not 
have the expected results, implying the slow response of the debt ratio to fiscal adjustment. 
Although the reasons for their failure are beyond the scope of this paper, the results suggest 
that a uniform fiscal consolidation program might be insufficient to establish debt 
convergence in troubled countries. 
This raises high concerns in terms of financial market funding of continuing fiscal 
deficits, unless, as Cottarelli and Jaramillo (2012) highlight, the composition of fiscal 
adjustment can be rebalanced to make it more ‘growth friendly’. A relief may only come 
from growth. Our results should be interpreted with caution. In particular, they do not imply 
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